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NOTES
"ENSURING SO GRAVE A CHOICE IS WELL
INFORMED": THE USE OF ABORTION
INFORMED CONSENT LAWS TO PROMOTE
STATE INTERESTS IN UNBORN LIFE
Kaitlin Moredock*
INTRODUCTION
With its 2007 decision in Gonzales v. Carhart,' the Supreme Court
essentially invited states to regulate abortion through informed con-
sent statutes. 2 Noting the power that informed consent statutes have
to persuade a woman to choose childbirth over abortion, Justice Ken-
nedy, writing for the Court, stated that " [t]he government may use its
voice and its regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the
life within the woman."3 Kennedy addressed the importance of
informed consent laws directly, stating that "some doctors may prefer
not to disclose precise details of the means that will be used," particu-
larly in abortion procedures.4 "[The] lack of information concerning
the way in which the fetus will be killed . . . is of legitimate concern to
the State. The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is
well informed."5 Kennedy encouraged states to craft informed con-
sent laws as a way to regulate abortion procedures and bear witness to
their respect for the life of the fetus.
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2011; B.S., Biology and
Psychology, University of Dayton, 2008. Many thanks to Professor O.C. Snead for his
guidance during the writing of this Note and to the staff of the Notre Dame Law Review
for their invaluable feedback and careful editing.
1 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
2 See id. at 156-60.
3 Id. at 157.
4 Id. at 159.
5 Id. (citation omitted).
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Two years before Gonzales, South Dakota did just that, enacting
an informed consent provision to further its interest in protecting
unborn life. The statute required the physician to inform the preg-
nant woman "[t]hat the abortion will terminate the life of a whole,
separate, unique, living human being[,J 6 . . . [t]hat the pregnant
woman has an existing relationship with that unborn human being
and that the relationship enjoys protection under the United States
Constitution and under the laws of South Dakota,"7 and "[t]hat by
having an abortion, her existing relationship and her existing consti-
tutional rights with regards to that relationship will be terminated."8
The statute also required the physician to provide the pregnant
woman with "[a] description of all medical risks of the procedure and
statistically significant risk factors to which the pregnant woman would
be subjected, including . . . increased risk of suicide ideation and
suicide."9
But Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South
Dakota and its director, Dr. Carol E. Ball, filed suit, arguing that the
disclosures required by the statute were facially unconstitutional.10
The plaintiffs asserted that the informed consent provisions violated
the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of pregnant women to be
free from forced indoctrination of the state's ideology, the Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest of pregnant women to choose an abor-
tion, and the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the physi-
cians to be free from being compelled to articulate the state's
ideology." The trial court granted the motion for a preliminary
injunction, finding that the disclosures "violate [d] the First Amend-
ment rights of abortion providers by compelling them to espouse the
State's ideology." 12 The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's
decision and remanded the case.1 3
On remand, the district court upheld the provision referred to as
the "biological disclosure"-"[t]hat the abortion will terminate the
life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being"' 4-because the
6 S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 34-23A-10.1(1) (b) (Supp. 2009).
7 Id. § 34-23A-10.1(1) (c).
8 Id. § 34-23A-10.1(1) (d).
9 Id. § 34-23A-10.1 (1) (e).
10 Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881, 975
(D.S.D. 2005), vacated and remanded, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
11 Complaint at 2, Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881 (No. Civ. 054077).
12 Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 886-87.
13 Planned Parenthood Minn., S.D., N.D., v. Rounds (Rounds Ill), 530 F.3d 724,
738 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
14 S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 34-23A-10.1(1) (b) (Supp. 2009).
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disclosure was not "untruthful, misleading, or not relevant to the
patient's decision to have an abortion."15 Yet the district court found
the "relationship disclosures" 16 untruthful and misleading and there-
fore unconstitutional.17 The "medical risk disclosures"1 8 were found
to be unconstitutionally vague, as well as untruthful and misleading.19
With regard to the mandate to inform women of increased suicide
risk, the court used Webster's Dictionary to define a "known" risk as one
that is generally recognized. 20 Though there were five studies
presented by the defendants showing an association between suicide
ideation and abortions, the court found that the risk was not "known"
and therefore disclosure of such a link was untruthful and
misleading.21
The juxtaposition of Justice Kennedy's invitation to state legisla-
tures to craft informed consent statutes to regulate abortions and the
decision of the federal district court in South Dakota to strike down
such provisions provides an opportunity to question the limits of what
states may accomplish with abortion informed consent statutes. Abor-
tion informed consent statutes are viable avenues for states to further
their interests in patient autonomy, women's health, and protection
of unborn life. Neutrality toward abortion is not constitutionally
required for informed consent legislation; states can use such statutes
to persuade women to choose childbirth over abortion in addition to
informing them about the nature of the abortion procedure. This
Note explores the extent to which informed consent statutes can be
used by states to promulgate such preferences and delineates what
can be included in such provisions. It delves into the question of
whether "relationship disclosures" are fundamentally different from
"biological disclosures" such that a state may not require physicians to
15 See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d 972, 976
(D.S.D. 2009).
16 See S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 34-23A-10. 1(1)(c) ("[T]he pregnant woman has an
existing relationship with that unborn human being and that the relationship enjoys
protection under the United States Constitution and under the laws of South
Dakota."); id. § 34-23A-10.1 (1) (d) (" [Bly having an abortion, her existing relation-
ship and her existing constitutional rights with regards to that relationship will be
terminated.").
17 Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 977-79.
18 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (1) (e) (mandating "[a] description of all
known medical risks of the procedure and statistically significant risk factors to which
the pregnant woman would be subjected, including . . . [i]ncreased risk of suicide
ideation and suicide").
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disclose to their patients that such patients have any type of relation-
ship with the unborn child. Part I gives a brief history of the right to
abortion and the current state of abortion jurisprudence. Part II
addresses the differing content of informed consent statutes that
states have used, drawing a distinction between substantive informed
consent provisions and procedural informed consent provisions. Part
III explores the Supreme Court's test for evaluating the constitutional-
ity of informed consent statutes and the treatment of that test in lower
courts, emphasizing how First Amendment concerns have become
conflated with the Fourteenth Amendment standard for evaluation.
Part IV examines the District of South Dakota's recent application of
the Supreme Court's test in Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North
Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds.22 This Note elucidates what legisla-
tures should be able to include in abortion informed consent statutes
under the Supreme Court guidelines. Namely, courts should recog-
nize that unless a provision places an undue burden on the woman's
right to choose abortion-by being untruthful, misleading, or not rel-
evant-it should be upheld.23
I. ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE
A. Roe, Doe, and Casey: Defining the Right to Choose
In Roe v. Wade,2 4 the Supreme Court famously made abortion a
fundamental right flowing from the Fourteenth Amendment right to
privacy and announced that laws curtailing abortion were subject to
strict scrutiny.25 A seven-to-two majority held that the concept of pri-
vacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment implicitly encom-
passed a pregnant woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. 26 The
Roe Court implemented the trimester framework, which in principle
allowed varying levels of state regulation of abortion after the first tri-
mester of pregnancy.2 7 Roe and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton,2 8
22 Id. at 972.
23 See infra Part III (discussing the application of the Supreme Court standard for
evaluating the constitutionality of informed consent statues).
24 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
25 See id. at 155; Thomas R. Eller, Informed Consent Civil Actions for Post-Abortion
Psychological Trauma, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 639, 652 (1996).
26 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56; Eller, supra note 25, at 651.
27 Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. Under this framework, the state could not intervene in
the woman's decision to have an abortion during the first trimester. During the sec-
ond trimester, a state could intervene only under the condition that it was acting in
the interest of the health of the woman. During the third trimester, the state could
ban abortion except when it was necessary to preserve the life or health of the
mother. Id. at 163-64.
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conceded that states are protectors of human life, but required any
restriction on abortion to have an exception for the life and health of
the mother.29 Doe further explained that "health" could mean any
physical, psychological, familial, or emotional factor, as determined by
the woman's physician.30 Because of the required health exception,
states were nearly powerless to effectively regulate abortions.
But in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,3
the Court shifted the right to an abortion to a liberty-based theory
under the Fourteenth Amendment and upheld portions of an abor-
tion informed consent statute. 32 The Court downgraded abortion
from a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny to a protected lib-
erty interest.33 Casey rejected the trimester framework, yet claimed to
reaffirm the central holding of Roe, which the Casey Court elucidated
as the assertion "that viability marks the earliest point at which the
State's interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legis-
lative ban on nontherapeutic abortions." 34
A plurality of the Court reaffirmed the view that, subsequent to
fetal viability, the state could promote its interest in the potentiality of
human life by regulating or even proscribing abortion, except where
it is necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.35 Previability, any restrictions enacted by the state must not
amount to an undue burden on the right of a woman to choose an
abortion.36 On the other hand,
[r]egulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism
by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may
express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if
they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of the
right to choose.37
28 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
29 Id. at 195; see also Eller, supra note 25, at 651-52 (discussing Roe's role in the
constitutional history of abortion consent).
30 Doe, 410 U.S. at 192.
31 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
32 The Court upheld the informed consent, parental notification, and facility
reporting requirements, but found the spousal notification provision to be unconsti-
tutional. Id. at 844-45, 900.
33 See id. at 846-53.
34 Id. at 860.
35 Id. at 877-79. "Health" still referred to the definition in Doe, namely, any phys-
ical, psychological, familial, or emotional factor, with the woman's physician holding
the sole power of determining what constituted a factor related to her health. Doe,
410 U.S. at 192.
36 Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
37 Id. at 877.
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The Court upheld Pennsylvania's informed consent statute
because "the information the State requires to be made available to
the woman is truthful and not misleading."38 The Court found that
the statute did not create a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an
abortion, and was thus not an undue burden.39 The Court upheld the
provision as a reasonable means to ensure that a woman's choice was
informed. 40 Furthermore, the Court held that the Constitution does
not forbid a State from "expressing a preference for normal child-
birth."4 ' But the Court also confirmed that "the essential holding of
Roe forbids a State to interfere with a woman's choice to undergo an
abortion procedure if continuing her pregnancy would constitute a
threat to her health."42
B. Stenberg and Gonzales: State Attempts to Regulate
Abortion Procedures
Keeping with Casey, in Stenberg v. Carhart3 the Court held that
abortion regulations must contain an exception providing for the
health of the mother. Like Doe's broad health exception require-
ment, the Court stated that regulations must allow abortion when it is
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of
the life or health of the mother.44 Though thirty states had enacted
38 Id. at 882. The Court's holding overturned its previous decision in City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), which struck
down informed consent statutes on the grounds that the information was "designed
to influence the woman's informed choice between abortion or childbirth." Id. at
444. The Casey holding also overturned the holding in Thornburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), which invalidated an informed
consent statute when it was found to be "an outright attempt to wedge the Common-
wealth's message discouraging abortion into the privacy of the informed-consent dia-
logue between the woman and her physician." Id. at 762.
39 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884-85.
40 Id. at 885; see also id. at 873 ("States are free to enact laws to provide a reasona-
ble framework for a woman to make a decision that has such profound and lasting
meaning.").
41 Id. (quoting Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989)); see
also Kathleen G. Chewning, Note, Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota,
South Dakota v. Rounds: The Journey to Protect Women's Mental Health with Relevant,
Truthful and Not Misleading Information in Informed Consent Abortion Statutes, 3 CHARLEs-
TON L. REv. 601, 606 (2009) (explaining that the Casey holding means that "a state
may further its interest in protecting potential life by ensuring that a woman's choice
is informed, but it must avoid hindering that choice through the imposition of an
undue burden on a woman's ability to obtain an abortion").
42 Casey, 505 U.S. at 880.
43 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
44 Id. at 936-38.
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statutes banning partial-birth abortion-a particularly gruesome form
of abortion 45-the Court struck down Nebraska's partial-birth abor-
tion statute for not providing such an exception.4 6 Though not con-
clusively demonstrated,47 the Court speculated that the procedure
might be necessary to preserve the health of the mother in some situa-
tions.48 In dissent, Justice Kennedy argued that such a broad excep-
tion essentially allows an individual abortion physician to make the
decision on whether a particular abortion procedure was preferable,
and thus constitutionally protected.4 9  But the Court disagreed,
explaining that "where substantial medical authority supports the pro-
position that banning a particular abortion procedure could endanger
women's health," the exception must be provided.50 The Court did
not address the underlying point that the Doe exception grants physi-
cians ultimate control over when the exception will actually come into
play in an individual case.
In Gonzales, however, the Court upheld the federal Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003,51 concluding that the Act does not require
45 For a description of partial-birth abortion techniques, see James Bopp, Jr. &
Curtis R. Cook, Partial-Birth Abortion: The Final Frontier of Abortion Jurisprudence, 14
ISSUEs L. & MED. 3, 7-25 (1998). Bopp and Cook distinguish between Dilation and
Extraction (D&X) and Dilation and Evacuation (D&E). Id. D&X involves delivering
the fetus feet-first up to the shoulders. As the head is in the opening of the uterus,
the surgeon inserts scissors into the base of the skull and evacuates its contents. The
surgeon then removes the intact fetus completely from the patient. Id. at 8. D&E
involves dismembering the fetus in-utero. Id. at 16. Bopp and Cook also note the
potential overlap and blurriness between these definitions, particularly when used in
statutes. See id. at 20-22.
46 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 936-38.
47 See id. at 937; see also id. at 966 (Kennedy,J., dissenting) (stating that no studies
concluded that the banned procedure was safer than other abortion methods).
48 See id. at 937 (majority opinion) ("[Tihe division of medical opinion about the
matter at most means uncertainty, a factor that signals the presence of risk, not its
absence."); see also Peter M. Ladwein, Note, Discerning the Meaning of Gonzales v. Car-
hart: The End of the Physician Veto and the Resulting Change in Abortionjurisprudence, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1847, 1872-73 (2008) (asserting that the Stenberg majority
engaged in an "undue burden"-like calculus to argue that Nebraska's law required a
health exception).
49 See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 968 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 938 (majority opinion).
51 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006) (outlawing the abortion procedure in which the doc-
tor "deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in the case of a
head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of the mother, or, in
the case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside
the body of the mother, for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person
knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus; and performs the overt act . .. that
kills the partially delivered living fetus").
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a health exception.5 2 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted
that "[r]espect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the
bond of love the mother has for her child,"53 and stated that "the
State may use its regulatory power to bar certain procedures ... in
furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the medical profes-
sion in order to promote respect for life."5 4 Absent from this decision
was the 'judicial deference and solicitude to the privacy of a physi-
cian's choices, a physician's autonomy, and a physician's judgment,
inaugurated in Roe."55 The Supreme Court found the Act constitu-
tional even in the face of medical and scientific uncertainty about
whether the Act's prohibition on partial-birth abortion would ever
impose significant health risks on women.56
In the Gonzales decision, Justice Kennedy opined on the necessity
of providing sufficient information to a woman considering an
abortion:
It is ... this lack of information concerning the way in which the
fetus will be killed that is of legitimate concern to the State. The
State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed.
It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to
abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more
profound when she learns, only after the event, what she once did
not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum
the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the
human form.57
While Gonzales did not specifically address informed consent stat-
utes, the Court made clear that women needed to be fully informed in
their choices concerning abortion.5 8
52 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165-67 (2007) (concluding that the Act was
not invalid on its face even though there was medical uncertainty over whether the
barred procedure was ever necessary to preserve a woman's health).
53 Id. at 159.
54 Id. at 158.
55 Ladwein, supra note 48, at 1886.
56 See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 162-63.
57 Id. at 159-60 (citation omitted).
58 See Chewning, supra note 41, at 608 (noting that though there were no reliable
data at the time to measure the phenomenon, the Court concluded that some women
come to regret their choice to abort their babies); see also Rebecca E. Ivey, Note,
Destabilizing Discourses: Blocking and Exploiting a New Discourse at Work in Gonzales v.
Carhart, 94 VA. L. REv 1451, 1482 (2008) (noting that because "Gonzales ignores the
woman's rights discourse and weaves the woman's health discourse and woman-pro-
tective discourse together," it allows the undue burden framework to give much more
room to the fetus than to the woman).
i980 [VOL. 85-5
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To conclude, women are currently allowed to obtain abortions.
States are allowed to regulate abortions previability in order to pro-
mulgate the interest in the life or health of the mother. States are
allowed to regulate abortions postviability in order to promulgate
either the interest in the life or health of the mother or the interest of
the fetus. As seen in Gonzales, such regulations need not always have
an exception for the health of the mother. According to Casey, any
previability regulation must not be an undue burden on the woman
seeking an abortion. As applied to informed consent statutes, the
undue burden standard means that, in order to be upheld under the
Fourteenth Amendment,5 9 any disseminated information must be
truthful, not misleading, and relevant to the decision to have an
abortion.
II. CONTENT OF INFORMED CONSENT STATUTES
Since Roe, states have used informed consent statutes to persuade
women to choose childbirth, and thus reduce the overall number of
abortions.60 This Part will explore the theory behind informed con-
sent requirements in general, the distinction between substantive and
procedural informed consent regulations, and the spectrum of
informed consent statutes enacted by state legislatures.
A. Informed Consent Theory
Respect for autonomy and self-determination is an animating
principle of modern biomedical ethics.6' Informed consent is one
avenue by which the field of biomedical ethics has balanced patient
autonomy and physician responsibility in such a way as to minimize
59 It is worth noting that courts seem to incorporate First Amendment concerns
into their Fourteenth Amendment analyses for informed consent provisions. See dis-
cussion infra Part III.
60 See Whitney D. Pile, The Right to Remain Silent: A First Amendment Analysis of
Abortion Informed Consent Laws, 73 Mo. L. REv. 243, 245-47 (2008) (discussing the
early compelled speech cases that laid the groundwork for informed consent laws); see
also Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: Informed Choice in Abortion
Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1617-20 (2008) (arguing that abortion informed
consent statutes often depart from traditional informed consent laws in that they are
enacted to discourage women from choosing abortion in a paternalistic manner and
sometimes require physicians to warn patients of health risks that are not generally
recognized).
61 0. Carter Snead, The (Surprising) Truth About Schiavo: A Defeat for the Cause of
Autonomy, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 387 (2005).
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paternalism. 62 Under this doctrine, the default rule is that "no medi-
cal intervention may be undertaken without the intelligent and volun-
tary consent of the patient."63 Informed consent to medical treatment
consists of three essential elements: communication of necessary
information, comprehension of that information by the patient, and
subsequent consent to treatment.64 The risks of the proposed treat-
ment, viable alternative treatments, and likely outcomes in the
absence of treatment must be communicated.65 Only through full dis-
closure can the patient undertake "an autonomous action . . . that
authorizes a professional . . . to initiate a medical plan for the
patient."66 These principles, which have been long recognized by the
common law, have been codified in state statutes that require doctors
to inform patients of risks of treatment, alternatives, and outcomes in
areas as diverse as breast cancer and psychiatric treatment.67
B. Substantive vs. Procedural Informed Consent Categories
Information contained in informed consent statutes can be
divided into two general categories. I refer to the first as "substantive"
informed consent statutes. In these regulations, states mandate spe-
cific information (or a category of information) that a physician must
disseminate to a woman seeking an abortion. This information regu-
larly would pertain to the nature, type, and risks of the abortion pro-
cedure in contrast to childbirth. This category also includes
information regarding characteristics of the fetus such as age, viability,
and ability to perceive pain. 68
62 W. NOEL KEYES, BIOETHICAL AND EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES TO MEDICINE AND
THE LAW 213 (2007).
63 See Snead, supra note 61, at 388. Of course, exceptions may be made in emer-
gency situations where the patient cannot consent to treatment.
64 Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed Consent, Def-
erence, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 111 (2008) (citing NAT'L
COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PRO-
TECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1979), available at http://ohsr.od.nih.
gov/guidelines/belmont.html).
65 Id.
66 RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 278 (1986).
67 See Tobin, supra note 64, at 111-12.
68 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-33 (West 2007) (requiring physicians to
inform the patients of the medical risks of abortion, probable gestational age of the
fetus, medical risks of carrying child to term, medical assistance benefits available for
prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care, that the father is liable to assist in the
support of the child, that public and private services exist for pregnancy prevention
1982 [VOL, 85:5
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The second category consists of "procedural" informed consent
provisions, which are included in informed consent statutes but do
not deal with specific information that must be disseminated. Rather,
they regulate the process for deciding to obtain an abortion, often
encouraging waiting, thoughtful reflection, or for an authoritative
person to provide abortion counseling.69 Examples of procedural
provisions include a requirement of a waiting period of either eigh-
teen or twenty-four hours before an abortion may be performed and a
requirement that only a physician may disseminate the substantive
information to the woman considering an abortion. 7 0 These procedu-
ral provisions facilitate comprehension of the informed consent infor-
mation to ensure that the consent given is meaningful and the woman
is truly informed about the abortion procedure. Although procedural
provisions are important to informed consent legislation, this Note
focuses on substantive informed consent provisions.
C. The Spectrum of Substantive Provisions
The content of informed consent statutes differs from state to
state. As of March 1, 2010, thirty-four states require that women
receive counseling before an abortion is performed; twenty-three of
those states detail the information that a woman must be given.7 1
Substantive provisions in these statutes require that the pregnant
counseling, and that the woman has the right to review materials provided by the state
that describe the states of fetal development and a list of agencies that offer alterna-
tives to abortions).
69 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-330(A)(1) (Supp. 2009) (requiring the physi-
cian who is to perform the abortion, or an allied professional working with the physi-
cian, to disseminate information to the woman and prohibiting an abortion from
being performed sooner than sixty minutes following completion of an ultrasound, if
one is performed).
70 Chewning, supra note 41, at 605.
71 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-903 (Supp. 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-
609(2)-(3) (Supp. 2008); IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1.1 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709
(2002); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.725(1) (West 2006); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.35.6(B) (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1599-A (2004); MAss. ANN.
GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12S (LexisNexis 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.4242 (West
2005); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-33(1) (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-104(5)
(2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-327(1) (2008); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 442.253(1) (Lexis-
Nexis 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE §14-02.1-02(6) (2009); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205
(West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-3(a) (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-330 (A)
(2002 & Supp. 2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-15-202(b) (2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
76(B) (2009); Wis. STAT. ANN. §253.10(1)(a)(3) (West Supp. 2010); see also
GUTrMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIODS FOR
ABORTION 1 (2010), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib MWPA.pdf.
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woman be given enumerated, but not exhaustive, information regard-
ing the procedure and its sequelae.72 This substantive information
can range from strictly biological and medical information to rela-
tional or legal information, such as information about state laws pro-
viding for the support of the woman if she chooses childbirth.73 An
example of medical information that the abortion provider must tell
the woman is as follows: that with advancing gestational age, her risk
for complications such as pelvic infections, incomplete abortions,
blood clots in the uterus, hemorrhage, cut or torn cervix, perforation
of the uterus wall, anesthesia-related complications, and breast cancer
increases.7"
Eighteen states require physicians to disseminate information on
the psychological effects of abortion.75 The scope of information
given on psychological effects varies: some states mandate that physi-
cians tell women that it is common to experience emotions that are
simultaneously positive and negative after an abortion.76 Other states
focus on negative psychological reactions, such as anxiety, guilt, and
regret.77 West Virginia, for example, issues materials that claim that
"after abortion many women suffer from symptoms including eating
disorders, sexual dysfunction, suicidal thoughts and drug abuse."78
Five states require the physician to include information on a possible
72 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1.1 (a); see also Chewning, supra note 41, at 605.
73 The Supreme Court has even condoned a preamble to a Missouri statute that
did not specifically deal with informed consent but rather governed abortion proce-
dures, which read "'(1) The life of each human being begins at conception; (2)
Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being; (3) The
natural parents of unborn children have protectable interests in the life, health, and
well-being of their unborn child."' Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,
504 n.4 (1989) (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1 (1986)). According to the Court,
the preamble was acceptable because it can be read simply to express a value judg-
ment, and it did not by its terms regulate abortion or any other aspect of medical
practice. Id. at 506. Were this language included in a substantive disclosure informed
consent provision, it would be considered a moral disclosure on the far end of the
spectrum.
74 See W. VA. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN REs., INFORMATION ON FETAL DEVELOP-
MENT, ABORTION, AND ADOPTION 10-11 (2003), available at http://www.wvdhhr.org/
wrtk/wrtkbooklet.pdf.
75 See Chinu6 Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent: The Med-
ical Accuracy of State-Developed Abortion Counseling Materials, GuTrMACHER POL'Y REV.,
Fall 2006, at 6, 8.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 9.
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link between breast cancer and abortion.79 As ofJuly 2006, the health
departments of twenty-two states, under the direction of their legisla-
tures, had developed materials to be distributed to women seeking an
abortion.80
Further towards a relational disclosure on the spectrum of sub-
stantive informed consent provisions is information on the ability of
the fetus to experience pain. In both 2006 and 2007, the Unborn
Child Pain Awareness Act was introduced into Congress, seeking to
"ensure that women seeking an abortion are fully informed regarding
the pain experienced by their unborn child."8' If enacted, the bill
would have required that the abortion provider impart certain medi-
cal and scientific information to a woman considering abortion after
twenty weeks of gestation, including the age of the unborn child,
information on the use of pain-preventing drugs that could be admin-
istered directly to the unborn child, a description of the risks of the
use of anesthesia, and information on the evidence that the unborn
child has the physical structures to experience pain and could possibly
feel pain during the abortion procedure.82 Though the bill did not
become law, several states responded by enacting similar legislation.83
Informed consent statutes in five states include information on the
ability of a fetus to feel pain. 8 4 Additionally, states have recently
79 Id. at 8. Minnesota mandates that the physician tell the woman that there is no
link between abortion and breast cancer. Id.
80 Id. at 7.
81 See Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2006, H.R. 6099, 109th Cong. (2006);
Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2007, S. 356, 110th Cong.
82 Katherine E. Engelman, Fetal Pain Legislation: Protection Against Pain Is Not an
Undue Burden, 10 QUINNIPAc HEALTH L.J. 279, 307-08 (2007). See generally Antony B.
Kolenc, Easing Abortion's Pain: Can Fetal Pain Legislation Survive the New Judicial Scrutiny
of Legislative Fact-Finding?, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 171 (2005) (theorizing that fetal
pain legislation should survive judicial scrutiny since medical and scientific data
underlie the legislative fact-finding regarding fetal pain and the level of division in
medical opinion about fetal pain is relatively low). But see Hannah Stahle, Fetal Pain
Legislation: An Undue Burden, 10 QUINNipiAc HEALTH L.J. 251, 264-65 (2007) (arguing
that fetal pain information is false and misleading and that fetal pain statutes are
vague and should thus be struck down by courts).
83 Engelman, supra note 82, at 309-10 (noting that Arkansas, Georgia, Minne-
sota, and Oklahoma have passed legislation requiring physicians to inform women
seeking abortions that fetuses feel pain and noting that these statutes could be held
unconstitutional if they have an improper state purpose, lack a medical emergency
exemption, or are vague).
84 See Richardson & Nash, supra note 75, at 9. Arkansas, Georgia, and Minnesota
identify twenty weeks as the point at which the fetus may begin to feel pain. South
Dakota materials state that an "unborn child may feel physical pain." Id. Texas
materials suggest that pain can be felt by a twelve-week-old fetus, but that "some
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begun including laws requiring an ultrasound or providing the option
of viewing the ultrasound of the fetus.8 5 Though such information
can be considered biological or medical, it does not directly pertain to
the health of the woman; rather, the physician is disseminating infor-
mation pertaining to the biological and medical status of the fetus.
But informed consent provisions are not simply limited to biolog-
ical and medical information about the woman or fetus. States
include information on legal and social resources surrounding the
choice to have an abortion. Twenty states require that the physician
provide referral resources for crisis pregnancy centers; thirteen
require referral resources for family planning services.86 Arkansas
mandates that the physician tell the woman "[t]hat a spouse, boy-
friend, parent, friend, or other person cannot force her to have an
abortion," "[t]hat medical assistance benefits may be available for ...
childbirth," and "[t]hat the father is liable to assist in the support of
her child."87 Indiana requires that the woman be informed "[t]hat
adoption alternatives are available and that adoptive parents may
legally pay the costs of prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care." 8
Kansas requires clinics where abortions are performed to post a state-
ment that it is against the law for anyone to force a woman to have an
abortion. 9 Louisiana law requires a physician to give the patient
materials with the following statement included:
There are many public and private agencies willing and able to help
you to carry your child to term, and to assist you and your child after
your child is born, whether you choose to keep your child or to
place her or him for adoption. The state of Louisiana strongly
urges you to contact them before making a final decision about
abortion. The law requires that your physician or his agent give you
the opportunity to call agencies like these before you undergo an
abortion.90
States may require the physician to inform the woman about the
effect of the procedure on the fetus as well. And a state may require
experts have concluded that the unborn child is probably able to feel pain at 20
weeks." Id.
85 Robert M. Godzeno, Note, The Role of Ultrasound Imaging in Informed Consent
Legislation Post-Gonzales v. Carhart, 27 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 285, 303-04 (2009) (dis-
cussing the different categories of recent legislation requiring ultrasound and the lack
of controversy surrounding these requirements).
86 Richardson & Nash, supra note 75, at 8.
87 ARY. CODE ANN. § 20-16-903(b) (Supp. 2009).
88 IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1.1 (a) (2)(C) (2008).
89 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709 (2002).
90 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.6(C)(1)(a)(i) (2008).
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the physician to inform the woman about laws that pertain to abortion
context, like the availability of child support, laws preventing others
from forcing a woman to have an abortion, and a state preference that
the woman contact agencies willing to assist the woman in carrying
the child to term.
III. THE SUPREME COURT STANDARD FOR INFORMED
CONSENT STATUTES
This Part elucidates the Supreme Court standard for evaluating
the constitutionality of informed consent statutes. It then goes on to
explore the application of this standard by inferior federal and state
courts.
A. The Casey Undue Burden Standard
In Casey, the Supreme Court gave a binding standard for evaluat-
ing the constitutionality of abortion informed consent statutes. The
Casey Court articulated a new test for reconciling the state's interest in
protecting fetal life with the liberty interest of the woman: the undue
burden standard.91 The line is drawn at viability: previability, a state
regulation violates the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest of the
woman if it is an undue burden on her right to choose abortion.92
Justice Kennedy explained that a state regulation may not have the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a previable fetus.93 With respect to
informed consent statutes, "the means chosen by the State to further
the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's
free choice, not hinder it."94
Yet the opinion hedged this standard by noting that it aimed to
protect the woman's right to make the ultimate decision, not the right
to be insulated from all other options in doing so; if a state measure
designed to persuade a woman to choose childbirth over abortion did
not have an undue burden on her right to choose, it would be
upheld.95 In other words, "[i]f the information the State requires to
91 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
92 Id. at 870-74. "Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a
woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart
of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 874.
93 Id. at 877; see also Chewning, supra note 41, at 606 (explaining the Casey undue
burden test as holding that "states may regulate pre-viability abortions so long as they
do not impose an undue burden on a woman's right to choose an abortion").
94 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
95 Id.
1987
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be made available to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the
requirement may be permissible."9 6 Indeed, the Court conceded that
the state does not need to be neutral in informing the woman's
choice; it can express a preference for childbirth over abortion.97 The
Court permitted a state "to further its legitimate goal of protecting the
life of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision
that is mature and informed, even when in so doing the State
expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion."98
The informed consent requirement at issue in Casey required
that, except in a medical emergency, a physician must inform the
woman of the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the abor-
tion and of childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the unborn
child at least twenty-four hours before performing an abortion.99 The
Court concluded that informing women of the nature of the proce-
dure, the attendant health risks of the procedure and those of child-
birth, and the probable gestational age of the fetus was relevant to the
woman's decision and would not amount to a substantial obstacle if
the information was truthful and not misleading.100 The Court also
found it constitutional for the state to require doctors to inform a
woman of the availability of materials relating to the consequences to
the fetus, even when those consequences have no direct relation to
her health.101
The Court dismissed the argument that physicians have a First
Amendment right not to provide state-mandated medical informa-
tion.'02 Reasoning that the speech at issue was "part of the practice of
medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State,"
the Court made it clear that compelled speech was not at issue with
regard to informed consent statutes.1 03 The requirement that a doc-
96 Id. at 882.
97 Id. at 883.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 881 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1990)).
100 Id. at 882.
101 Id. at 883 ("We conclude . .. that informed choice need not be defined in such
narrow terms that all considerations of the effect on the fetus are made irrelevant.").
Such materials included information on fetal development and resources for assis-
tance should the woman decide to carry her pregnancy to term. Id.
102 See Pile, supra note 60, at 252.
103 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. But see Pile, supra note 60, at 258 (discussing abortion
informed consent laws from a First Amendment perspective and arguing that "when
an informed consent law compels physicians to deliver the State's moral or ideologi-
cal messages, rather than scientific facts, that informed consent law exceeds constitu-
tional limits"); Christina E. Wells, Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity: The Free Speech
Implications of Rust v. Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
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tor give a patient certain information in obtaining her consent for
abortion is constitutionally the same as the requirement that a doctor
give certain specific information about any medical procedure.1 0 4
Casey thus established that an abortion informed consent statute
may only require a physician to disseminate information that is truth-
ful, not misleading, and relevant to a woman's decision of whether or
not to have an abortion.105 If a regulation creating a structural mech-
anism by which the state expresses profound respect for the life of the
unborn satisfies those three criteria, it is not a substantial obstacle to
the woman's right to choose and is permissible under the Fourteenth
Amendment.106 If those three criteria are not met, however, then the
statute imposes an undue burden on a woman's right to choose to
have an abortion and is unconstitutional. 10 7 Yet Casey gave lower
courts little guidance to aid them in the determination of what should
be considered truthful, not misleading, and relevant.
B. What Is an Undue Burden in the Context of Informed Consent?
Several cases at the inferior federal court and state court levels
have attempted to apply this test. Though the test seems like a
straightforward method of evaluating how a provision will affect the
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest of the woman, courts seem to
have imported First Amendment concerns on behalf of physicians
into their analysis of informed consent statutes.
In Eubanks v. Schmidt,108 the statute at issue was essentially the
same as the Pennsylvania statute in Casey, so the Western District of
Kentucky used a similar evaluation.109 The statute itself required that
the descriptive materials provided by the physicians be "objective and
nonjudgmental, and shall include only accurate scientific informa-
tion."110 Even though some of the fetal development photographs
included in the pamphlet were color-enhanced and others were
enlarged, the court found the materials to be "truthful and not mis-
1724, 1764 (1995) (arguing that the Casey court erred when it disregarded the First
Amendment's implications on abortion counseling, weakening the decision).
104 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
105 See Chewning, supra note 41, at 609.
106 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
107 Id.
108 126 F. Supp. 2d 451 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
109 Id. at 454, 460.
110 Id. at 459. It is important to note that the "objective and nonjudgmental" stan-
dard came from the statute itself, not from an interpretation of Casey.
1989
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leading.""' Though the physicians were required to give a woman
considering abortion a list of agencies available to assist her, the court
found the materials fair and balanced; therefore, they were not mis-
leading and did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
rights of the women considering abortion.112
With regard to the physicians' First Amendment rights, the
Eubanks court held that "[i] t is possible to convey information about
ideologically charged subjects without communicating another's ide-
ology, particularly in the context of the reasonable regulation of medi-
cal practice." 13 Even though the legislature passed the statute to
further its preference for childbirth over abortion, the pamphlets did
not "overtly trumpet that preference," so the court did not consider
them compelled ideological speech. 114 Though this analysis was
ostensibly distinct from the analysis of the undue burden on the
woman, the court seemed comfortable with allowing the provisions to
stand because "[t]hey provide information from which a woman
might naturally select the choice favored by the legislature."' 15 It
seems as if principles from the undue burden analysis crept into the
court's First Amendment analysis.
The Eighth Circuit utilized Casey's undue burden test in uphold-
ing an informed consent provision in Fargo Women's Health Organiza-
tion v. Schafer.1 6 The statute at issue required the abortion provider
to tell the woman the name of the physician who would perform the
procedure, the medical risks of abortion, the probable gestational age
of the fetus, and the medical risks of pregnancy.117 The court rea-
soned that this substantive information was similar to that involved in
the Pennsylvania statute in Casey, so those particular provisions of the
statute could not be considered an undue burden for women in
North Dakota. 18
The statute at issue in Fargo Women's Health Organization also
required the physician to advise the woman that medical assistance
111 Id. (emphasizing that the pictures provided an accurate rendition of the fetus
at various stages of development, and that the plaintiffs did not seriously challenge
any of the other scientific and medical information contained in the packet).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 458 n.11; see also Chewning, supra note 41, at 611 (recognizing that it is
possible for information that is controversial or ideological in nature to still satisfy the
truthful and not misleading standard).
114 Eubanks, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 458 n.11.
115 Id.
116 18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994).
117 Id. at 531.
118 Id. at 532-33.
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benefits may be available and the father is liable for child support. 119
Since the provision did not require that the physician definitively state
that medical benefits were available and the statement that the father
is liable for child support finds support in other North Dakota stat-
utes, these statements were not considered misleading or false. 120
The court upheld these provisions, noting that the physicians could
disassociate themselves from the printed materials and could also
comment on the father's medical assistance liability provisions.1 21
Thus, though the court did not mention the First Amendment, it
seems as if the ability of the physicians to distance themselves from the
information that they provided alleviated concerns about compelled
speech and may have been a factor in enabling the provisions to
remain constitutional. In other words, the court seemed to import a
First Amendment-type analysis into its Fourteenth Amendment
undue burden analysis. Also, the fact that the court upheld these pro-
visions, even though they were further away from the medical or bio-
logical end of the disclosure spectrum, speaks to the range of material
that can be included in an informed consent statute.
In Karlin v. Foust,122 the Seventh Circuit explained that the undue
burden test is best understood by examining the Court's application
of it in Casey. According to the Karlin court, in using the undue bur-
den standard "courts should not focus on whether the challenged reg-
ulation merely has the effect of making abortions a little more
difficult or expensive to obtain." 23 Courts should instead focus on
"the practical impact of the challenged regulation and whether it will
have the likely effect of preventing a significant number of women for
whom the regulation is relevant from obtaining abortions."124 Rather
than simply making abortions more difficult to obtain, a challenged
regulation must have a strong likelihood of preventing women from
obtaining abortions in order to be found unconstitutional:
119 Id. at 533-34.
120 Id.
121 Id. But see Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 428 (N.J. 2007) (refusing to import
a common law duty to a physician to tell a pregnant patient that an embryo is an
existing, living human being and that an abortion results in the killing of a family
member). The common law doctrine of informed consent in that jurisdiction
requires doctors to provide women seeking abortions only with what the court
referred to as "material medical information, including gestational stage and medical
risks involved in the procedure." Id.
122 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999).
123 Id. at 481.
124 Id.
1991
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By drawing the constitutional line at persuasion, the undue burden
standard should not invalidate those state regulations designed to
persuade a woman to carry her fetus to term, even though those
regulations may incidentally burden the woman's abortion right by
making an abortion more expensive or inconvenient to obtain; how-
ever, when those regulations actually prevent women from having
abortions they would otherwise choose to have, then they pose an
unconstitutional undue burden.12 5
In addition to finding some procedural provisions constitu-
tional,1 26 the Karlin court upheld a provision requiring the physician
to inform her patient that fetal heartbeat auscultation services were
available over objections that the disclosure was false and misleading
because technology cannot discern a fetal heartbeat before ten weeks
of pregnancy.' 2 7 The court found that the information to be con-
veyed was neither false nor misleading: the services were available to
all women, yet would only render useful results after a certain point in
pregnancy.12 8 Also, the court found it persuasive that the exact con-
tent of the discussion was left to the discretion of the physician.' 29
Though the court resolved this inquiry under the "false and mislead-
ing" standard, First Amendment concerns on the behalf of the physi-
cians again crept into the analysis, but the court was alleviated of these
concerns by the ability of the physician to further explain her own
medical opinion.
In Summit Medical Center of Alabama, Inc. v. Riley,130 a federal dis-
trict court in Alabama specifically noted that the truthful, not mislead-
ing, and relevant standard articulated in Casey does not require that
information be ideologically neutral. The Riley court held that the
125 Id. at 482.
126 The Karlin court concluded that a waiting period did not constitute an undue
burden since it did not prevent women from having abortions they would otherwise
choose to have. The court also noted that it was not enough for a plaintiff to show
that the number of abortions declined after the passage of a state abortion regulation
because "that result is entirely consistent with a state's legitimate interest in persuad-
ing a woman to carry her child to term"; the plaintiff must also explain that this effect
was due to the preventative nature of the law for the regulation to be found unconsti-
tutional. Id. at 485-87.
127 Id. at 491-92.
128 Id. at 492.
129 Id. ("Like the informed consent provision that requires a physician to discuss
the risk of psychological trauma, a physician is required to inform the woman that
fetal heartbeat services are generally available, but consistent with our interpretation
of the former provision, if the physician believes that such services are not specifically
available to a patient because her fetus has not reached a particular gestational age,
then that is what the physician must disclose.").
130 274 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
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First Amendment rights of physicians were not violated by an
informed consent statute requiring them to disseminate pro-child-
birth materials.' 3 1 The truthfulness of the materials was not at issue;
the argument of the physicians that they were being required to dis-
tribute materials that they did not agree with was unsuccessful.13 2
The Tennessee Supreme Court struck down an abortion
informed consent provision under a standard other than the Casey
undue burden standard; Tennessee precedent requires strict scrutiny
of all laws restricting fundamental rights, procreative rights among
them.'33 The majority in Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v.
Sundquist criticized the undue burden standard as being so subjective
as to be "essentially no standard at all."1 34 Physician-only counseling
requirements, as well as mandatory waiting period requirements, were
struck down under the Tennessee Constitution.13 5
Based upon the treatment of Casey by these courts in general, it
seems as if "truthful, not misleading, and relevant" is a workable test
by which to evaluate the constitutionality of abortion informed con-
sent statutes. Courts have responded affirmatively, albeit inconsis-
tently, to the reasoning behind the Casey decision: women have a right
to make an informed decision regarding an abortion and states can
further their interest in the fetal life through informed consent stat-
utes so long as physicians are required to disseminate only truthful,
not misleading, and relevant material. Substantive provisions can
even include information fairly far removed from medical or biologi-
cal disclosures involving the mother's health; physicians may even be
required to disclose information on the availability of a fetal ultra-
sound or liability of the father for child support. Disclosures need not
be cabined to the mother's health to satisfy the "truthful, not mislead-
ing, and relevant" standard.
131 Id. at 1271. The court found the portion of the statute that required the physi-
cians to pay for the dissemination of such materials unconstitutional under the First
Amendment doctrine that the expression that the plaintiffs are required to support
must be "germane to a purpose related to an association independent from the
speech itself." Id. at 1277.
132 Id. at 1271.
133 Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tenn.
2000).
134 Id. at 16.
135 Id. at 22.
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IV. MISAPPLICATION OF THE "TRUTHFUL, NOT MISLEADING, AND
RELEVANT" STANDARD IN ROUNDS
On remand from the Eighth Circuit, the District of South Dakota
misapplied Casey's "truthful, not misleading, and relevant" standard.
Under the court's reading of South Dakota's informed consent law,
the physician must tell the woman that the abortion will terminate the
life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being, but the physi-
cian cannot be required to tell the woman that she has any relation-
ship with that human being or that any relationship that she has with
that human being is entitled to legal protection. The court side-
stepped prior cases allowing disclosures about legal or social issues,
focusing on the fact that one of the required disclosures regarded
relationships rather than biological or medical facts. Yet under the
"truthful, not misleading, and relevant" standard, the relationship dis-
closure should have been upheld. Additionally, the court erred in
striking down the medical risk provisions by employing too strict of a
standard of review.
A. Biological Disclosure
Judge Schreier of the District of South Dakota upheld the provi-
sion referred to as the "biological disclosure": "That the abortion will
terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human
being." 36 The district court followed the Eighth Circuit's determina-
tion that Planned Parenthood "[could not] succeed on the merits of
its claim that [the biological disclosure] violates a physician's right not
to speak unless it can show that the disclosure is either untruthful,
misleading, or not relevant to the patient's decision to have an abor-
tion."137 Because the statute mandated that the physician tell the
woman that the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate,
unique, living human being, and "human being" in this case means an
individual living member of the species of Homo sapiens during its
embryonic or fetal age (and Planned Parenthood submitted no evi-
dence to oppose that conclusion), the district court followed the
Eighth Circuit's prompt and upheld that portion of the statute.138 In
no way was the information that the woman would be terminating the
136 Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d 972, 976
(D.S.D. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-
10.1(1)(b) (Supp. 2009)).
137 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D.,
S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735 (8th Cir. 2008)).
138 Id. The Eighth Circuit relied on the testimony of a physician and geneticist in
the legislative record, who stated:
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life of a human being untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant to her deci-
sion; consequently, the statute was not an undue burden on her right
to choose to have an abortion and was constitutionally acceptable.
B. Relationship Disclosures
The district court found the "relationship disclosures" 139 untruth-
ful and misleading and therefore unconstitutional, even after reiterat-
ing that the Eighth Circuit noted that "while the State cannot compel
an individual simply to speak the State's ideological message, it can
use its regulatory authority to require a physician to provide truthful,
non-misleading information relevant to a patient's decision to have an
abortion, even if that information might also encourage the patient to
choose childbirth over abortion."140 Citing Black's Law Dictionary,141
the court determined that a relationship is the nature and association
between two or more people. 142 The court dismissed a volume of
Supreme Court cases that supported a finding of a relationship
between a mother and a child by stating that all of those cases
involved the relationship between a parent and a born child.143
The court failed to recognize that Roe itself created a relationship
between a pregnant woman and her unborn child: the mother is the
sole arbiter of the child's fate. Under Roe, the mother is the only per-
son allowed to determine if the child will be carried to term or will be
Becoming a member of our species is conferred immediately upon concep-
tion. At the moment of conception a human being with 46 chromosomes
comes into existence. These chromosomes, the organization, the chromo-
somal pattern is specifically human. The RNA, the messenger protein, the
proteins are distinctly human proteins. So this new human being is a mem-
ber of our species, and humanity is not acquired sometime along the path, it
occurs right at conception.
Rounds III, 530 F.3d at 728.
139 Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 977 ("[T]he pregnant woman has an existing rela-
tionship with that unborn human being and that the relationship enjoys protection
under the United States Constitution and under the laws of South Dakota." (quoting
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1) (c) (Supp. 2009))); id. (stating "[t]hat by having
an abortion, her existing relationship and her existing constitutional rights with
regards to that relationship will be terminated" (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 34-
23A-10.1 (1) (d))).
140 Id. (citing Rounds III, 530 F.3d at 734-35).
141 BLACK'S LAW DicIONARY 1314 (8th ed. 2004).
142 Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 977 ("In the legal context, 'relationship' is defined
as 'the nature and association between two or more people; esp. a legally recognized
association that makes a difference in the participants' legal rights and duties of care."
(emphasis omitted)).
143 Id. at 978.
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terminated.14 4 No other actor is allowed to make this determination,
and the state may not place an undue burden on the woman's right to
make this decision. Also, viability is the line of demarcation with
regard to state involvement. Before viability, states can only intervene
to promote their interest in the life and health of the woman. After
viability, states can intervene to promote their interest in the life and
health of the fetus.1 4 5 Viability itself is a measure of the unborn
child's dependency on the mother; viability means that the child
could survive outside of the mother's womb. 1 4 6 The constitutionality
of state action depends on the biological and developmental relation-
ship between the pregnant woman and the unborn child. In that
respect, there is a very clear constitutional relationship between the
pregnant woman and the unborn human being that will be ended
once the pregnant woman undergoes an abortion.
In addition, the court disregarded the fact that unborn children
have been treated as "persons" in federal statutes such as the Unborn
Victims of Violence Act (UVVA).1 47  The UVVA indicates that
"unborn children, whether viable or not, will be considered as human
beings and therefore, whole persons as victims of crime."148  The
court also did not recognize any ethical problem with distinguishing
between human beings and constitutional persons. In Alexander v.
Whitman,149 the Third Circuit determined that New Jersey could
extend protections to fetuses through wrongful death statutes, but was
not obligated to do so. 150 The Alexander court, reasoning that "the
issue is not whether the unborn are human beings, but whether the
unborn are constitutional persons," drew a distinction between per-
144 See discussion supra notes 24-28.
145 See discussion supra notes 31-36.
146 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DicrONARY 2548 (1986).
147 Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006) (punishing
the killing of an unborn child or the termination of a wanted pregnancy); see also
Robert Steinbuch, The Butterfly Effect of Politics over Principle- The Debate over the Unborn
Victims of Violence Act and the Motherhood Protection Act, 12 QUINNIPIAC HmArH L.J. 223,
231-32 (2009) (discussing how political concerns surrounding abortion resulted in
"murky lawmaking").
148 Amanda K. Bruchs, Note, Clash of Competing Interests: Can the Unborn Victims of
Violence Act and over Thirty Years of Settled Abortion Law Co-Exist Peacefully , 55 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 133, 151-52 (2004). Bruchs characterizes the UVVA as the first federal legal
recognition of personhood for the unborn and places heavy emphasis on the fact that
the UVVA draws no distinction between previable and viable fetuses. Id. at 147-53.
149 114 F.3d 1392 (3d Cir. 1997).
150 Id. at 1406.
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sonhood and human beings.15 1 Then-Judge Alito recognized a prob-
lem with this distinction in his concurrence, stating:
I think that the court's suggestion that there could be "human
beings" who are not "constitutional persons" is unfortunate. I agree
with the essential point that the court is making: that the Supreme
Court has held that a fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the reference to constitu-
tional non-persons, taken out of context, is capable of misuse.152
The Rounds court gave no consideration to any problems that
could arise from treating human beings as distinct from constitutional
persons; the ethical implications that could follow from creating a sub-
class of human beings that are not constitutional persons were not
enough reason for the court to uphold the relationship disclosures.
Similarly, the court dismissed South Dakota statutes including
unborn children in the definition of "person" since none of those stat-
utes addressed whether there is a protected legal relationship between
a pregnant mother and an unborn child. 15 3 Also unpersuasive to the
court were several South Dakota cases finding a cause of action for the
wrongful death of both viable and nonviable children. 154 Since
"South Dakota has not recognized that the relationship between a par-
ent and an unborn embryo or fetus is a legal relationship protected by
state laws," the court found the relationship disclosure untruthful and
misleading.155
Reasoning that she could not find a statute that directly spoke of
the unborn child as a person, capable of a legal relationship with the
mother, Judge Schreier deemed this portion of the statute to be
untruthful and misleading.15 6 Under the Casey evaluation, that find-
151 Id. at 1402.
152 Id. at 1409 (AlitoJ., concurring) (citation omitted).
153 Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d 972, 978-79
(D.S.D. 2009) (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 21-5-1 (stating that any person, including
an unborn child, can bring a wrongful death cause of action); id. § 22-16-4 (stating
that first degree murder is the premeditated killing of any other human being, includ-
ing an unborn child); id. § 59-7-2.8 (stating that artificial nutrition and hydration for
pregnant women to allow the continuing development and live birth of the unborn
child in certain circumstances is required); id. § 25-7-19 (stating that the child neglect
statutes apply to an unborn child that has been conceived); id. § 22-16-7 (stating that
second degree murder is a killing perpetuated by an act imminently dangerous to
others and without regard for human life of another person, including an unborn
child)).
154 Id. at 979 (citing Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996);
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ing necessarily means that the regulation places a substantial obstacle
in the way of women seeking abortions and is an undue burden on
their right to abortions; as such, it was struck down. Yet the court's
application of the standard was misguided. The court used a legal
dictionary's definition of "relationship" and a narrow understanding
of "personhood" to deem it "untruthful" to tell a woman that she has a
legally protected relationship with the fetus. Interestingly enough,
the opinion cited three South Dakota statutes that included an
unborn child in the definition of "person."15 7 Yet those statutes were
not enough for the court to conclude that an unborn child was capa-
ble of a relationship as defined in the legal dictionary.
By cabining the definition of "relationship" and "person" in such
a manner, the court itself imported a misleading meaning to the stat-
ute. Properly understood, telling a pregnant woman that she has an
existing relationship with an unborn human being and that abortion
will terminate that relationship is truthful, not misleading, and rele-
vant to her decision. It should thus stand. Just because this disclosure
does not strictly pertain to the medical consequences of the proce-
dure to the woman does not mean that it should be held to a higher
standard of constitutional scrutiny. Like laws in other states that
require a physician to inform the woman that the father could be lia-
ble for child support or that the state urges the woman to contact an
organization that would give her support through pregnancy and
birth, this provision does not prove problematic under the First or
Fourteenth Amendments.
C. Medical Risk Disclosures
The "medical risk disclosures"158 were found to be unconstitu-
tionally vague.159 According to the court, because the term "risk fac-
tors" was not defined in the statute, it did not provide adequate notice
to physicians as to what should be disclosed.160 With regard to the
157 Id. at 978-79.
158 Id. at 979 (stating that "[a] description of all known medical risks of the proce-
dure and statistically significant risk factors to which the pregnant woman would be
subjected, including . . [i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide") (quoting
S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e) (Supp. 2009)).
159 Id. at 981. ("Because a 'risk factor' refers to a predisposing condition that a
patient has before a procedure, it is improperly used in the same clause as 'medical
risk,' which is something that a patient is subject to during or after a procedure. As
the statute reads, physicians are required to disclose 'risk factors to which the preg-
nant woman would be subjected to,' which is confusing and actually impossible.").
160 Id. Judge Schreier cited only one authority in her discussion of this issue:
Schmitt v. Nord, 27 N.W.2d 910, 913 (S.D. 1947). Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 981
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mandate to inform women of increased suicide risk, the court used
the Merriam-Webster Dictionary to define a "known" risk as one that is
generally recognized. 6 1 Though there were five studies presented by
the defendants showing an association between suicide ideation and
abortions, the court found that the risk was not "known" and there-
fore disclosure of such a link was untruthful and misleading.162 The
court gave no reasoning as to why a dictionary should be the sole
determinant of what information a woman should be given before she
makes a decision with the potential to have a profound impact on her
health. Waiting until a risk is "generally recognized" could have a det-
rimental effect on a woman's health, particularly if several peer-
reviewed studies show causality between abortion and negative long-
term sequelae. Peer-reviewed studies have shown a significantly
higher age-adjusted risk of death from suicide for women who aborted
compared with women who delivered.163 Yet the court disregarded all
legislative fact-finding on that particular issue and determined that
women were not entitled to information on the medical risks of abor-
tion until such risks have reached the "generally recognized" status. 164
The court also failed to speak to the Eighth Circuit precedent of
Fargo Women's Health Organization v. Schafer,165 which upheld a North
Dakota statute requiring the physician to inform the patient of the
("[S] tating that a statute 'must be construed, and the intent and meaning of the Leg-
islature ascertained, from the language of the act, and words used therein are to be
given their ordinary meaning unless the context shows that they are differently
used."' (quoting Schmitt, 27 N.W.2d at 913)).
161 Id. at 983.
162 Id.
163 See, e.g., David M. Fergusson et al., Abortion in Young Women and Subsequent
Mental Health, 47 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 16, 17-18, 22 (2006) (finding that
those women who had an abortion before age twenty-five had elevated rates of subse-
quent mental health problems including depression, anxiety, suicidal behaviors, and
substance use disorders); Mika Gissler et al., Injury Deaths, Suicides and Homicides Associ-
ated with Pregnancy, Finland 1987-2000, 15 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 459, 462 (2005) (find-
ing that owing to elevated suicide and homicide rates an increased risk of death was
observed for women after abortions); David C. Reardon et al., Deaths Associated with
Pregnancy Outcome: A Record Linkage Study of Low Income Women, 95 So. MED. J. 834, 834
(2002) (finding that those women who aborted had a 2.54 times higher risk of death
from suicide than those who delivered).
164 See Kolenc, supra note 82, at 182-95 (noting that, in general, courts will defer
to legislative fact-finding unless the issue involves a constitutional fact, particularly
when there is a thorough legislative record and not a significant amount of medical
or scientific division surrounding the facts). But see Tobin, supra note 64, at 130-40
(concluding that, although the Gonzales court left to the legislature considerations of
marginal safety, including balancing risks, courts will not apply a deference principle
to legislative findings in abortion informed consent cases).
165 18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994).
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medical risks of childbirth and of abortion. 166 Though the statute at
issue in Rounds differed from the Schafer statute in that it specified
certain risks that the physician must mention, it should have still been
upheld since, just as in Schafer, the physician would be able to distance
herself and explain that the risks were those that the legislature had
found relevant, removing from it the possibility of being a Fourteenth
Amendment undue burden, which has become conflated with First
Amendment concerns.
To conclude, the Rounds court misapplied the Casey "truthful,
not misleading, and relevant" standard to invalidate several substan-
tive abortion informed consent provisions. By ignoring precedents
speaking to the constitutionality of informed consent provisions
regarding legal or social issues, particularly when the physician can
distance herself from the information or supplement it with her own
professional judgment, the Rounds court essentially employed a
higher standard of scrutiny than the Supreme Court dictates for sub-
stantive informed consent statutes.
CONCLUSION
The recent decision in Rounds provides good cause to examine
what states can include in abortion informed consent statutes, particu-
larly after the Supreme Court, in Gonzales, invited states to enact such
statutes to ensure that women are fully informed before they make
such a grave decision and to witness their respect for the sanctity of
unborn life. Casey set the standard for evaluation of such statutes at
"undue burden." That standard comports well with informed consent
theory, which looks to balance patient interests in autonomy with the
paternalistic practice of medicine.167 An informed consent provision
should not unduly burden the choice of a patient as to childbirth or
abortion; it should ensure that the woman is fully aware of all of the
risks and outcomes of that procedure as compared to alternatives. As
lower courts have grappled with what "undue burden" means, there
seems to be a difference between informed consent provisions that
mandate specific content be given to women considering abortion
and informed consent provisions that specify procedures to be fol-
lowed in the consent process. 168
Statutes requiring physicians (or abortion providers) to dissemi-
nate substantive information to women considering abortion should
be evaluated under a "truthful, not misleading, and relevant" stan-
166 Id. at 536.
167 See discussion supra notes 61-67.
168 See discussion supra Part II.
[VOL. 85:52000
2010] ENSURING SO GRAVE A CHOICE IS WELL INFORMED
dard. This standard also fits in well with informed consent theory,
which fosters communication of necessary information, comprehen-
sion of that information by the patient, and subsequent consent to
treatment.169 The woman will only be able to consent effectively to
the "treatment" of abortion if the information that she is given is
truthful, not misleading, and relevant; otherwise, she is consenting
without fully understanding what she will undergo. Information
about the risks of the procedure to the woman's health, including the
long-term effects of the procedure, as well as information regarding
the fetus would be included in this category. Details such as the age of
the fetus, viability, stage of development, and pictures of fetal develop-
ment could be provided by the physician to the patient. Another pos-
sibility is requiring the physician to tell the woman about the ability of
the fetus to feel pain; under the truthful, not misleading, and relevant
standard, this provision would be upheld as long as the fetus was past
the developmental stage at which pain-sensing structures form.
As the Rounds court held, the truthful, not misleading, and rele-
vant standard does not prevent the state from mandating the physi-
cian to tell the woman that the abortion is terminating the life of a
whole, separate, unique, living human being. Since "human being" is
statutorily defined as a biological member of the human species, there
is nothing untruthful or misleading about this statement. No scien-
tific or medical research will contradict this statement. Therefore,
states should be able to enact a similar provision without concern for
violating the First Amendment rights of the physician or the Due Pro-
cess rights of the woman.
A requirement that the physician tell the woman that she has a
relationship with the unborn child that will be terminated by abortion
should be subject to the same level of scrutiny as biological disclo-
sures. The Rounds district court misapplied the truthful, not mislead-
ing, and relevant test by using a dictionary to define a relationship as
requiring two people and disregarding the constitutional relationship
between a pregnant woman and a fetus created in Roe as well as all of
the South Dakota and federal statutes including unborn children in
the category of "people." Notwithstanding the Rounds district court
decision, relationship provisions should be upheld provided that the
reviewing court uses the appropriate construction of "relationship"
and "personhood". No precedent requires a relationship to be
between two people. Roe even creates a legal relationship between a
pregnant woman and her fetus in that she is the sole arbiter of the
fate of the fetus. Furthermore, even if a relationship was required to
169 See discussion supra note 64.
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consist of two people, an unborn child is considered a "person" for
the purpose of at least one federal statute, as well as in laws providing
a wrongful death cause of action for killing a viable fetus in the major-
ity of states. 170 Courts should not use the fact that an unborn child is
not considered a "person" for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in the context of abortion to negate the unborn child's "per-
sonhood" for a variety of other purposes, like wrongful death causes
of action, first and second degree murder charges, life sustaining mea-
sures, and child neglect statutes. Even though such relationship dis-
closures are further down the spectrum than a medical disclosure
about the effect of the procedure on the fetus, it should still be
upheld under the truthful, not misleading, and relevant standard.
Information about the long-term effects of the procedure, both
physical and psychological, should also be upheld under this stan-
dard, provided that it is supported by peer-reviewed studies and shows
statistical significance. The Rounds district court misapplied the stan-
dard by disregarding much of the legislative fact-finding on medical
risks and instead using a dictionary to support the proclamation that
before a legislature can mandate a physician to tell her patient about
risks, such risks must be "generally accepted." For a provision about
long-term effects to be upheld, the legislative record should reflect
the sound basis for requiring a physician to tell her patient about a
risk accompanying the abortion procedure.17' Since a principle con-
cern of the doctrine of informed consent is to provide for the auton-
omy of patients and prevent overly paternalistic decisionmaking, it
seems to be within the state's interest to provide for the woman's
autonomy and ensure that her physician does not withhold informa-
tion about risks that could drastically affect her life in the future.
Also, allowing the physician to distance herself from the risks by stat-
ing that the legislature has deemed them important seems to alleviate
any First Amendment concerns that creep into the Fourteenth
Amendment undue burden analysis.
State legislatures should take heed of possible misapplications of
the Supreme Court standard like those that occurred in Rounds and
recognize that preliminary injunctions may delay the effectiveness of
their informed consent statutes. Yet informed consent statutes will
still be a viable way for states to further their interests in patient auton-
omy, women's health, and the protection of unborn lives.
170 See discussion supra notes 147, 153-57; see also Steinbuch, supra note 147, at
231.
171 See discussion supra note 164.
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